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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 981513-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
JOHN RICHARD KOCHER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The defendant, John Richard Kocher, appeals from a judgment of conviction for
exercising unlawful possession of a motor vehicle, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993), possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(Supp. 1996), and interference with
a peace officer making an arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-305 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the
respective standards of appellate review:
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL

Issue. Was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for the unauthorized
control over a motor vehicle?

Standard of Review. The standard of review of a claim that the evidence is not
sufficient to support a jury verdict is narrow. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
1985). The appellate court "review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Petree, 659
P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983). An appellate court will "reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted." Id.; see also Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL

Issue. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it denied defendant's motion
for a mistrial after a State witness inadvertently referred to defendant's possession of stolen
checks?
Standard of Review. The decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial lies within
the sound discretion of the trial court, State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367,369, 517 P.2d 1322,
1324 (Utah 1974), and the appellate court "will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion
for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah
1997). Moreover, the appellate court "review[s] such a decision with just deference because
of the advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the impact of events occurring in
the courtroom on the total proceedings, and this is especially so when what actually occurred
is in dispute." Id. at 1231.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are IK 4 dctci niiiiui 11 \ i
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged by information wit

i

degree Oloin in \ milium ul I li.ih ( nik Ann, § 76-6-404(1995); (2)purchase,possession,
or transfer of a handgun by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a) (1995); (3) unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in viV
interfere

...

)

peace officer making an arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995). R. 3-7, On defendant's motion, count II charging
defendant with the purchase, possession, or transfer of a handgun by a restricted person was
severed and ticfetiu.u,; \\A\ tnu,l !.\

i , • uv: wnumuv \l\wx: VPI.HU \\ "*' ™", !0X ":,i

After receiving a lesser included instruction, R. 66; R. 108:278-79, the jury acquitted
defendant of theft of a motor vehicle and returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser included
offense of unlawful control over a motor vehicle, i s'utii v "ode Ann, >-, -i i i a I •»' i i i; I ww;,j R.
$

verdicts of guilty on the remaining two counts which

have not been challenged on appeal. R. 82-83,108: 322-23. The court sentenced defendant
to serve an indeterminate term not to exceed one year for unlawful control over a motor
vehicle, K, H{K 10 " I,! \>. Defendant timely filed a notice ol appeal I. "'^
3

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Taking of the Car. Ken Troester and his wife, Tamera, owned a 1995 Monte Carlo
which was predominantly driven by Mrs. Troester. R. 108: 123-24. Mr. Troester testified
that the car had been stolen on April 12,1997 while his wife was using the car. R. 108:125.
Mrs. Troester had explained to her husband that she had left the keys in the car with the car
running. R. 108: 125. Mr. Troester had never authorized defendant to use the car. R. 108:
123.
That morning, some time before 10:25 a.m., Cari Reeves was sitting in her car at a
Circle K in West Valley City waiting for her daughter to come out of the store. R. 108:128,
173-74, 242. Ms. Reeves was parked facing the Circle K next to a green car parked to her
left. R. 108:128-29. As she waited for her daughter, Ms. Reeves observed defendant "come
out of nowhere," get into the green car, and leave. R. 108: 130.
Defendant did not come out of the Circle K, but approached the car from the rear. R.
108: 129. Defendant walked between the two cars toward the Circle K as if he were going
into the store. Id. However, he then stopped, turned around, and looked into the green car
through the passenger window. R. 108:129,133-34. Defendant then very "casually" walked
around the rear of the vehicle to the driver's side of the car and got in. R. 108:129-30. Once
in the car, defendant hurriedly backed out—without looking to see if anyone was behind him
and in a fashion that caused the tires to squeal. R. 108: 130, 134-35. Defendant took about
one minute from the time he walked between the two vehicles until he entered the Troester's
car and drove away. R. 108: 134.
4

Earlier that morning, defendant had gone to his friend's house near llie i ink' k in
WVsl \'iiili"\ Hh "In ic lie hrrjiinr1 iiifiiMii .itrii mi ini'lliMiiiphtMainiiii

I1' M)K' *M(i MO.

While at his friend's house, defendant reportedly received an emergency page from his
girlfriend, Stacy Nelson, from the home of her friend, Tiffany Farnsworth, in Salt Lake City.1
R 108 216 1 ) , 225 Defendant testified that he had no vehicle, and because 1 le w as so high,
h

•

N-- .

* •

J6:236.

However, when defendant got to the Circle K near his friend's home, he saw the Troesters'
parked car running in idle so he stopped, got into the car, and drove to Ms. Farnsworth's
reside! I ::e ii istead R 108:23 7.

.

' ' '•

•. • • . •

Search for Defendant. After defendant drove away, Ms. Reeves entered the Circle K
because she believed defendant had just stolen the car. R. 108:130. Upon entering the store,
Ms. Reeves observed a woman in the store who she guessed had just noticed that her car was
g

s.

Reeves entered the store and so she gave police a description of defendant, i^. * ^ .

A „l.

Officer Daniel Delao from the West Valley City Police Department arrived at the Circle K

defendant argued at trial that his taking of the Troesters' car was justified as a
result of his concern for Ms. Nelson's safety. R. 108: 304-05; see also Instruction No. 22,
R. 69. The defense put on evidence that defendant's girlfriend was being threatened by
certain members of an organization called the Sundowners with whom she previously
associated in connection with her methamphetamine use. R. 108:206,209-10. The
defense elicited testimony that defendant and his girlfriend developed an emergency
pager system using the numbers "9-1 1 to contact defendant if there was an emergency.
R. 108: 210-11 Ms. Nelson claimed that she received voice mail after voice mail
containing threats, and, as a result, she and others paged defendant several times that
morning. R. 108: 212-14, 216.
5

at 10:25 a.m. on a reported auto theft. R. 108: 147, 173. Upon arrival, Officer Delao met
with Mrs. Troester who he identified as the victim. R. 108: 147-48.
Based on information obtained from Mrs. Troester, Officer Delao put out an A.T.L.
(attempt to locate) on the Troester's car. R. 108: 148. In addition to the car, Mrs. Troester
told Officer Delao that a cell phone had also been taken (the phone had been left in the
vehicle in plain sight). R. 108:148. When Officer Delao called Mrs. Troester's cell number,
he heard heavy metal rock music and what sounded like someone dialing. R. 108: 149.
Officer Delao could not understand what was said on the other end and the call was then
disconnected. R. 108: 150.
Officer Delao next contacted someone from Mrs. Troester's cellular phone company
who identified a telephone number, which was subsequently matched to a Salt Lake City
address, that had been repeatedly dialed from Mrs. Troester's cell phone within the last
couple of minutes. R. 108: 150. The Salt Lake City address was the location of the home
of Ms. Farnsworth, the friend of defendant's girlfriend. R. 108:217-19. Officer Delao drove
to within a few houses of Ms. Farnsworth's home in Salt Lake City where he met with
Officer Aylor from the Salt Lake City Police Department. R. 108: 152. Officer Delao saw
the Troesters' car parked at the Salt Lake City address and observed defendant get into the
driver's side of the car. R. 108: 153.
Capture of Defendant. When defendant got into the Troesters' car, the officers drove
their vehicles into the driveway to block defendant's egress from the driveway. R. 108:15455. Defendant did not respond to the officers' commands to put his hands on his head and
6
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the officers

iilLrlriiiJaiii \ l q i p a i mil of lliu un and .luulh, icfuMk ill limn

'

' officer \ > loi i insi iccessfully ait *mpted to deploy his

OC spray (a derivative of cayenne pepper), defendant fled on foot until he was grabbed by
Officer Delao while attempting to climb a fence. P. 108:158-59. Defendant continued to
r

e

ground and stop resisting, R. 108: 160, 163. During the struggle, which lasted six to seven
minutes, Officer Delao seized a gun from the back of defendant's waistline. R 108: 161,
164.

Defendant hit Officer Delao and repeatedly grabbed for his legs. Officer Aylor

several times before they were able to subdue defendant and effect his arrest. R. 108: 16065. Upon a search of defendant following his arrest, officers found a hypodermic needle2 and
a white plastic baggie containing a rock-like substance later identified as methamphetamine.3
R. 108; 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendant argues that because Mrs. Troester did not
t

•

v,

defendant argues that the State failed to establish that defendant did not have permission to
use the vehicle. Defendant's claim is without merit. The testimony presented by the State,
2

The hypodermic needle

u>nA

3

7.

Officer Delao testified that h e also found two books of stolen checks. However,
this statement was ordered stricken and the jury was instructed to disregard reference to
the stolen checks. R ma-i*7.*9.
7

and the reasonable inferences drawn from that testimony, provided more than sufficient
evidence to establish that defendant took the vehicle without the consent of the Troesters.
Defendant's behavior when he first observed the car to the time he squealed out of the
parking lot was not consistent with someone who had permission to take the car. There was
no evidence indicating that he ever entered the store to obtain permission from Mrs. Troester
who was at the store. The jury could also reasonably infer that the police would not put out
an A.T.L. after talking to the owner unless the car had been taken without her permission.
The jury could infer that the elaborate attempts to locate the vehicle would not be necessary
if defendant had permission to use the car. The jury could infer guilt by defendant's attempt
to flee from officers.
Finally, defendant himself testified that when he came upon the car and noticed that
it was running, he simply "figured" it was all right to borrow the car. He did not ask. This
testimony removes all doubt as to whether or not defendant had obtained permission to use
the car.
Motion for a Mistrial. Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it failed to declare a mistrial for Officer Delao's inadvertent reference to stolen checks.
However, because the reference was isolated and inadvertent, and because the trial court
promptly instructed the jury to disregard the statement and immediately gave a curative
instruction, any prejudicial impact of the improper statement was neutralized. That the jury
conscientiously applied the jury instructions is evidenced by the jury's acquittal of defendant
on theft and conviction on the unlawful control over a motor vehicle.
8

r
I H E E v i D E N C E WAS SUFMCIEIN 1 1 U S U F P U K l 1 ME J UK ¥ S V E R D I C T
O F G U I L T Y F O R U N L A W F U L C O N T R O L OVER A M O T O R VEHICLE.
Following closing arguments, defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the theft
charge (and its lesser included offense), and now seeks reversal on appeal, on the grounds
thatlhr r< tdnioi; v MI*; nr.ii!IMIIMII IIUM.IMISII llml (IVInid.iiil did nnl Ihtvi" pmnission Iti use
theTroesters' car. 4 k . iuo. j<J9-iG, 2 1 . Aplt. Brf. at 12. Defendant argues that the evidence
is insufficient to establish this element because "ftlhe state [was] required to put on a li\ e
witness
d

*. u.Bri.cu i..

+,;

^H.^IMU

JH^MU

- . * •

wadure to appear certainly made it more

vr i .

•- -

_ ||
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case. 5
The testimony of Mr Troester established that he and his wife owned the car and that
she was driving it ui. .».*. «.. .. AastakwwL^ v i ^ i ^ a ^
u . - r^M ?..-

t!

^..med
nddefen "

challenge his testimony on appeal. Accordingly, the only i ^ u e before this Court is \vhet:__i
or not there was sufficient evidence before the jury from which it could reasonably find that
Mrs.

s

Il mii»estc! did ill nil ;",i .v delendjiil perm ISM

ill I ' i i " " illllin , . i r .

'Although the trial court did not expressly dei i) the i i lotioi I, it did so ii i 1pl.Ied.l3
^nt the matter to the jury.
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Although the State intended to call Tamera Troester, R. 108: 55, for reasons not
apparent from the transcript, the State was unable to secure her attendance and instead
called her husband, Kenneth Troester R '<>8 121.310.

When considering a challenge based on insufficiency of the evidence, the appellate
court "review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.'9 State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah
1983), superseded by rule on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1997). The
standard of appellate review is narrow and the Court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the jury. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342,345 (Utah 1985). Id. Accordingly, the appellate
court will sustain the jury's findings and verdict "unless the evidence is so inherently
improbable or unsubstantial that a reasonable person could not have reached the same
determination beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780,781 (Utah 1986).
In other words, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made," the court
will uphold the verdict. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.
A.

The Evidence Presented by the State, and the Reasonable Inferences Drawn
Therefrom, Were Sufficient to Establish That Defendant Did Not Have
Consent to Use the Troesters' Car.

As noted above, Mrs. Troester, who was using the vehicle when it was taken by
defendant, did not testify at trial. However, the victim's testimony, which would have
provided direct evidence that defendant did not have permission to take the car, was not
necessary to prove the State's case. The testimony elicited by the State, and the reasonable
inferences drawn from that testimony, provided more than sufficient evidence to establish
that defendant took the vehicle without Mrs. Troester's consent. See State v. John, 586 P.2d

10

410, 4 1 --12 (Utah 1978) (recognizing circumstantial evidence "as a valid niethod of
aseeilttiiiiiijj1 lllii; 111 ill II) III
On cross-examination, IVn. 11 oester testified that there were not times when he didn *t
know whether or not his wife gave someone else permission to use the ear-though he
conceded it was possible that she could allow others to dri\ e the car without first checking
w i (III I I ni ni mini I lllii1 I I

ni il I ni i mimiI iiiiii in llns fc Jiiiitiiih

nillill ni ni N
I leu 1 br iiiiMilfinHit lh m l

the verdict. However, the State's evidence was not confined to Mr. Troester's testimony.
Ms. Reeves observed the defendant "come out of nowhere"—he did not come from
the store, but approached i,^ V J; i^,— Lne rear, R 108: 129. I le w alked in betweei i I\ Is.
T

F'^

;1 lpai ked facing

e

store as if he were going in. R. 108: 129-30. However, defendant never went into the store.
Instead, defendant stopped, turned around, and peered into the Troesters' car through the

defendant noticed that the keys wc

the car and the vehicle was n inning in idle

the

condition under which Mrs. Troester had left the car..6 R, 108: 125.

6

Defendant argues that statements from Mrs, I roeste i It I :li I iii ig tl i = • stat = tit: lei it t o
her husband that she left the keys in the car with the car n in: H iii ig. :ai m: i : 11: • i • :• : i isidered ii I
connection with the insufficiency claim because they cc i istiti it = III \i it : lissit I = 1 learsay.
Aplt. Brf at 14. However, because defendant failed to : I: \ )• : • : t il: : • till lis t = stii :i i : ny at trial, he
is precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal absent plain error (which he
has not alleged). See Stale v. Perry, 871 P.2d 576, 581 (Utah App. 19- •*] As such, the
statement was before the jury and is properly considered by this Court on appeal.
11

Defendant then "really casually" walked around the Troesters' car from the rear. R.
108:129-30. However, as he got into the Troesters' car, defendant's behavior and demeanor
changed entirely. He became agitated or hurried. R. 108:139. He did not carefully back out
of the parking lot. Instead, he backed up in a manner that caused the tires to squeal, without
checking to see if anyone was behind him. R. 108: 130, 134-35. He went from casually
looking the car over for approximately one minute, R. 108: 134, to "squealing" out as he
backed up and drove away. Defendant's behavior was not consistent with someone who had
permission to drive the car.
This was in fact the inference that Ms. Reeves drew. Believing that the car had just
been stolen, she went into the store to notify the owner and saw a woman who she "guessed"
had "just noticed [that] her car was gone." R. 108: 130-31. When Ms. Reeves entered the
store, someone was already on the telephone with the police. R. 108:131. Accordingly, Ms.
Reeves then gave the police a description of defendant. R. 108: 131.. R. 108: 131. When
Officer Delao arrived at the Circle K, he contacted Mrs. Troester who he identified as the
victim. R. 108: 147-48.
Moreover, the jury reasonably could infer that it was Mrs. Troester in the store who
appeared to have "just noticed [that] her car was gone." R. 108: 131. Officer Delao then
obtained information from Mrs. Troester, and, based on that information, he put out an
A.T.L. on the Troesters'vehicle. R. 108:147-48. Thejury reasonably could infer that it was
unlikely Mrs. Troester would provide the officer with information, and, based on that
information, he would then put out an A.T.L. on the car, if Mrs. Troester had given defendant
12

peimi. mill
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was provided and the ,A 1 I | il
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Troester to take the vehicle. Indeed, the opposite inference—that Mrs. Troester authorized
a man high on methamphetainine to take her car to the site of expected violence, leaving her
a v: •

.j^oi-^L .w juror could have drawn.
Moreover, police were able to locate ri^ferJ *

itX

'•.U^I-TV

.

g

the phone number that had been recently dialed on Mrs. Troester?s cell phone and matching
that number with a corresponding address. P 108* 1 ^fM3, \ zain. the jury reasonably could
infer ilii il li.nl I Ir. Il

'

...

_,.... . aave

had to go to such great lengths to locate the car, nor would the police assisted '

' a

search. This inference is strengthened by the feet that defendant had 1 ler cell phone, R. 108:
1-

. AC r;^« ^ .vii mwi j . .

phone t :: detei n line I lis locati :: i i

ibion, she couni nave simply called him on the cell
In ::l z i J, ' 1 ic i i

defendant did not respond. R. 108: 150. A \galn, these facts support an inference that
defendant did not have permission to use the veh; '

defendant claims that any statements made by Mrs. I roester to the officer are
inadmissible hearsay. The officer's statement that Mrs. Troester gave him information,
and that he subsequently put out an A.T.L. based on that information, is not hearsay.
Officer Delao did testify that Mrs. Troester told him that, in addition to the car, a cell
phone in the car had also been taken, R 108: 148. However,, defendant did not object to
the admission of this hearsay statement, R. 108: 148, and therefore, the issue was not
preserved for appeal. See Perry, 871 P.2d at 581 As such, it is evidence the jury could
consider.
i

J

,

When defendant was confronted by police, he did not cooperate with officers but
instead fled from the officers and resisted arrest. R. 108:155-65. The jury reasonably could
infer that defendant's flight was indicative of a guilty conscience resulting from unlawfully
taking the car. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991) (holding that "flight or
concealment may give rise to an inference of a guilty conscience and therefore an inference
of guilt").
Based on the foregoing testimony presented by the State in its case in chief, the jury
reasonably could infer that defendant did not have Mrs. Troester's permission to use the car.
Defendant's behavior when he first observed the car to the time he squealed out of the
parking lot was not consistent with someone who had permission to take the car. There was
no evidence indicating that he ever entered the store to obtain permission from Mrs. Troester
who was at the store. The jury could also reasonably infer that the police would not put out
an A.T.L. after talking to the owner unless the car had been taken without her permission.
The jury could also infer that the elaborate attempts to locate the vehicle would not be
necessary if defendant had permission to use the car. Finally, the jury could infer guilt by
defendant's attempt to flee from officers.
B.

The Evidence Presented by Defendant Further Established that He Did Not
Have Mrs. Troester's Consent to Use the Car.

Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency was not made until after closing
arguments. Accordingly, the jury also had before it evidence presented by defendant which
supported a jury finding that he did not have consent to use the car. Defendant himself
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provided direct evidence that he never obtained permission to use the Troesters' car. The
_ ^ l i a n g e took place on dii ectexai i in latioi iregardii igcl z fei i ::lai: it" staking of the car:
Defense

W.. ..hen you got to tl le Circle K?

LOUL

Defendant
. '..

car running, I stopped, I was thinking maybe I
could call somebody to help but 1 didn't know who to call
or anything; the car running, I figured it would be okay for
me to borrow it to go over to the house to make sure she
was all right 1 wasn't trying to steal :+ '-— u ~ or
n m t h i n o I u i-. !i» * w o r r i e d iVwint ^sf

. Counsel
,-ndant

5o vs nat did \ o u uo. Vou got
Yes, ma'am,

Defense L u u n . ^
•nciar:

1 :i 21 e did ] • :)i 1 gc ""/

• '• ":;;-- •

•' •

: ceeded to go over to Tiffany's house. I was calling
her on the phone The lady had a cell phone in her car and
when you turn,, a cell phone on, it's got a phone number to
the phone, on her phone. I was trying to call the lady on
her own number on the phone, I kept getting a busy
number, I was so high, I didn't realize that I was calling
her own number on her pay phone-or her cell p h o n e . . . .

R 108: 237 (emphasis added),
1 * *i^;. .a- .

^ ^ n i i u i ; } , i:^iwiore, estaDiisiic:> u , ^ nc J i J ,-»M uutain permission

to use the car. H e did not
approached the store, he saw the Troesters' car running in idle and so he stopped before ever
entering the store, i ic Unjugiii uc could call someone, but then again, he did not know who
II11 mil Instead, IK , a* 1 d ill \ lUiili] I 1 i.i ' I

IllMmon ' lln, i,,n II"'" III IK, J" i /

In liyiiri1

means "to believe," as in he "didn't figure it w 01 lid happe t i ' Wreb sh u ' s I """, f < ii Rh >er s/< h •
University Dictionary;

476 (1988) He did not know it would be okay because he did not ask

Mrs. Troester. Had he asked her, he would have known whether or not it would have been
okay to use the car. Defendant simply took the car without asking. His failure to
affirmatively testify that he received Mrs. Troester's permission to use the car reasonably and
logically leads to the inference that he did not do so. Having testified, defendant "cannot
escape the consequences of any fact testified to by him or of his omission to deny or explain
any fact tending to establish his guilt which was testified to by others.9' State v. Romero, 554
P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).
Moreover, defendant's girlfriend testified that she was scared, even frantic, as a result
of threats she was receiving on her voice mail that day. R. 108:213-17. This, after all, was
an emergency page and defendant needed to save his girlfriend. R. 108:236. He called Ms.
Nelson on the cell phone and instructed her to stay inside the house, to lock the doors, and
to not answer the door. R. 108: 237. Yet, upon arriving at the Salt Lake residence, instead
of seeking protection from defendant, Ms. Nelson's primary concern was the fact that
defendant had taken a car. When he went into the house to check on her, Ms. Nelson "started
screaming at [him] for having somebody else's car" and she told him that they "need[ed] to
get the damn thing back." R. 108: 238. This behavior is not consistent with the volatile
situation described by defendant and Ms. Nelson.
Moreover, Ms. Nelson testified that after defendant checked on her welfare, she asked
him where he got the car. R. 108: 218. Defendant responded that he got it "from Circle K."
Id. Such a response does not support an inference that he borrowed the car from Mrs.
Troester, but rather the opposite inference that he took it from a Circle K without the owner's
16

knowledge. Had he obtained Mrs. Troester's permission, he would likely have told Ms.
Nelson (hat iir h rrowed il In,nil I"1 Jr.. I roester, not ;;iui U1 gu» .• iroin a u k i c i "

u

~

told him that they needed to return the vehiVlf *l^>iui •
paperwork identifying the owner's address. Id. Again, had he borrowed the car, he would
likely know to whom and how to return the car.
i

L.'* ..J.

therefrom, together with the testimony oi defend:)

M

iereiicL\> ;:.J. wu;* DO drawn
'' '

•

lV

< nil

to support the jury's verdict. It cannot be said that "the evidence is so uihuLcntly improbable
or unsubstantial that a reason** .* person could not have reached the same determination

including reasonable inferences," from which the ji iry could reasonah1 • find that defendant
did not have Mrs. Troester's consent to use the car. Booker, "09 P.2d at 345. Accordingl)r,
jphoiu Lw ,^is. *
II.

: ^ I I U A L L u l R r AC'I ED WI'I 'HIN I I S D I S C R E T i O N WHEN n
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AFTER A STATE
WITNESS INADVERTENTLY REFERRED TO DEFENDANT'S
POSSESSION OF STOLEN CHECKS.
Prior to trial, the court granted m par! dciuiudm":* motion in limine to introduce

evidence of prior Ivi 1 iii t\ \ Iiiin li appak'nll'i iiiii liiiinl 1 .in , n f u r i m

I > Jo'lt III i l i u k ' i

recovered from defendant in a search following his arrest.8 R. 33,108:8-9, l ° v ^ - H r r - "

8

The ruling, which was referenced by defendant's trial counsel i
-hiccup .J
by the State or otherwise corrected by the court, was apparently not mauc un uic record.
SeeR. 108: 193, 198-200.
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course of the trial, however, Officer Delao inadvertently made reference to the stolen checks.
R. 108: 167. The trial court sustained defendant's objection, ordered that the statement be
stricken, and gave a curative instruction. R. 108: 167-69. At the close of the State's case,
defendant moved for a mistrial on this ground, but the trial court denied the motion. R. 108:
193-203. Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for
a mistrial. Aplt. Brf. at 16. As explained below, however, the trial court acted within its
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court. State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 369, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1974).
"If in exercising its discretion, the [trial] court concludes that the incident probably did not
prejudice the jury,.. .the court should deny the motion." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1230-31.
In a recent decision, the Utah Supreme Court observed that "[i]t is the trial court's
responsibility to determine if the incident rises to the level requiring a mistrial, and it is the
trial court which must decide if an can incident may have or probably influenced the jury, to
the prejudice of [the defendant].'" State v. Cardall, No. 970433, 1999 WL 318812, at *4
(Utah May 21,1999) (citations omitted; brackets in original). Accordingly, this Court "will
not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion."
Robertson,932?2d

1219,1230 (Utah 1997). The appellate court "review[s] such a decision

with just deference because of the advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the
impact of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings, and this is especially
so when what actually occurred is in dispute." Id. at 1231.
18

I><rfrndmImi I.IIIIIIIK1,, tiiuil Hie luili " iiti* i m.ljdiige between llic |»iosccutor and Officer
Delao warrants a mistrial:
Prosecutor

Did 1

• ^d anythi*

•'

Witness
Prosecutor
Witness

Defense Counsel

p

\ou locate0
>^ ... \w\.'. ,- .- . * wi the suspe^.
mug^;
" - ^a- ,i L; ^J,, jrmic needle
>J>A\ ;:. : ........ pocket,
- .. ,he hypodermic needle was next to him. Theaccording to my report here, there's-there's two books of
stolen checks and a yellowish—
Your Honor, object IV-I i he-if we could have a motion
utside the-the-there were no stolen checks, that -he-the
officer was instructed not to sa) anything about stolen
checks,

rejudice from an improper reference to another crime can be sufficiently cured

796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App 1.990) Accordingly, the trial court immediately ordered tl lat
the statement be stricken, instructing the jury as follows:
Members oi
, that is not charged nor relevant nor material
in this case, and one of the functions that I have is to insure that the-as the
evidence gets past me to yen >! ** ; Kuh w i • .IN- ™\^ .~t ^A ~..t
prejudicial.
Sometimes, extrinsic things get said that really aren't germane or
nt to the charges before you and-and reference to these other materials
isn't legally relevant with respect to the charges before us today, so
1 mfeuiiigto ask you to disregard any reference, utterance made by this or any
other witness to matters that are not legally pertinent, specifically the last
statement regarding some checks which were-may or may not have been
found and may or may not have been stolen or whatever, that h^ no bearing
nM,,nD
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whatsoever in this case and you're just to disregard that utterance in it's
entirety and I'll order it be stricken. Okay?
R. 108: 167-68.
Defendant argues that this curative instruction was not merely inadequate; he argues
that the instruction did more damage by emphasizing the improper testimony. Aplt. Brf. at
21. However, were the Court to follow defendant's reasoning, rarely, if at all, would a
curative instruction be sufficient. As the Utah Supreme Court recently observed:
There is rarely a case in which a trial judge is not called upon to affirm an
attorney's objection and instruct the jury to disregard an improper question or
an improper answer a witness has given. Such instructions are curative
instructions that trial judges routinely give during the presentation of evidence
as well as at the end of trial, before the jury deliberates. If a trial judge could
not correct errors as they occur, few trials would be successfully concluded.
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271-72 (Utah 1998).
The State does not dispute that reference to the stolen checks was contrary to the trial
court's ruling. However, the prosecutor only asked the question to establish defendant's
possession of methamphetamine, an element of the charge for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance. See R. 72. Therefore, Officer Delao's reference to stolen checks was
inadvertent and isolated. R. 108: 200. The State did not exploit the statement in closing
argument. R. 108: 287-98, 306-08. Moreover, the instruction provided the jury with a
modest explanation for the court's ruling without unduly emphasizing the statement.
Consistent with defense counsel's position, the trial court did not emphasize the statement
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further with an additional curative instruction at the end of trial.9 See R. 108:202. Although
curative instructions are not a "cure-all," the appellate court will "'normally presume that a
jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to
it, unless there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury will be unable to follow the
court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be
"devastating" to the defendant.'" Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273 (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483
U.S. 756, 767 n.8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 n.8 (1987)).
On his motion for a mistrial, defense counsel argued that the jury may very well
reason that defendant's possession of stolen checks is evidence that he's a thief who never
intended to return the Troesters'car. R. 108:196-97. Similarly, on appeal, defendant argues
that the jury likely assumed defendant was a bad person and that reference to the stolen
checks might have improperly convinced the jury that the car was also stolen. Aplt. Brf. at
20-21. However, that the jury followed the curative instruction is evidenced by its acquittal
of defendant on the theft charge and its verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense.
Although the jury rejected defendant's justification defense, R. 108: 69, it clearly
accepted defendant's position that he did not intend to permanently deprive the Troesters'
of the vehicle as required for a theft conviction. Far from demonstrating an "overwhelming
probability" that the jury could not follow the court's instructions, defendant's acquittal on
the theft charge was proof positive of "the jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath, including

9

However, the trial court did give general instructions to the jury that it should not
consider any evidence stricken by the court. R. 49, 52, 108: 268, 271.
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its promise to follow all of the judge's instructions." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 272. The jury's
verdict demonstrates that the jury did not conclude that because he stole checks, defendant
also stole the car. Had the jury so concluded, it would have returned a verdict of guilty for
theft of a motor vehicle. Therefore, the officer's inadvertent reference to the stolen checks
was not "so prejudicial and devastating to [defendant] as to vitiate the mitigating effect of
the court's curative instruction." Id. at 273 (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a mistrial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm
defendant's conviction.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions on appeal, the State does
not request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion be issued.
Respectfully submitted this ZH day of June, 1999.
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